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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IRA EOYAL L. TRIBE, et al., \ 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, I 
f Case No. 
—
v s
-~ ) 13856 
SALT LAKE CORPORATION, et al., \ 
Defendants and Respondents. J 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for a declaratory judgment to de-
termine constitutionality of the Utah Neighborhood De-
velopment Act (Section 11-19-1 et seq., Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953) and of actions taken and proposed to be taken 
by the defendants and respondents pursuant to such act 
and to determine the proper interpretation of certain 
provisions of such act. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, was pre-
sented documentary and testimonial evidence and enter-
ed judgment in favor of defendants and respondents 
holding that the Utah Neighborhood Development Act 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Act") is constitutional 
1 
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and that certain resolutions of certain of the defendants 
are lawful and valid, including resolutions approving a 
plan for the issuance of bonds by the Salt Lake City 
Redevelopment Agency ("Redevelopment Agency") for 
the payment of which certain parking revenues and 
"tax increments" are pledged. (E. 99-100). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
trial court and a declaration that the Act and the activi-
ties undertaken and proposed by the defendants pur-
suant thereto are violative of both state and federal law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs Tribe own real and personal profperty 
within an area of Salt Lake City designated as the C.B.D. 
West Neighborhood Development Agency Project Area 
(the "Project Area")? that is, the blocks and streets ad-
jacent thereto of the two block area bounded on the 
north by First South Street, on the east by Main Street, 
on the south by Third South Street and on the west by 
West Temple Street. (R. 90, 93, 94). Plaintiff Christen-
sen does not own property within the Project Area but 
like the Plaintiffs Tribe is a qualified elector and 
taxpayer of Salt Lake City and each annually pays prop-
erty taxes levied by Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
Salt Lake City School District and the other taxing agen-
cies who levy taxes on property located within Salt Lake 
City. (R. 91). Action was brought by the plaintiffs on 
their own behalf and, in Count II, on behalf of themselves 
2 
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and all other members of a class which they represent 
consisting of qualified electors of Salt Lake City who 
pay property taxes. 
; Salt Lake City Corporation (the "City") is a city 
of the first class organized and operating under the laws 
of the State of Utah. (R. 92). The Redevelopment 
Agency of Salt Lake City (the "Redevelopment Agen-
cy") was created by the City on June 10,1969, in accord-
ance with authority purportedly granted by the Utah 
Neighborhood Development Act (Chapter 19, Title 11, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, first adopted as Chapter 5, 
Laws of Utah 1969, First Special Session and subse-
quently amended in part by Chapter 5, Laws of Utah 
1970, Chapter 17, Laws of Utah 1971 and Chapter 4, 
Laws of Utah 1974, Budget Session; said Act to be dis-
tinguished from the Utah Community Development Law, 
Chapter 15 of Title 11, Utah Code Annotated 1953). 
(R. 91, 121). As authorized by Section 11-19-3, the mem-
bers of the Board of Commissioners of Salt hake City 
Corporation, they being the "legislative body" of the 
City, were designated as the Redevelopment Agency 
of the City. (R. 91). The official name of the Redevelop-
ment Agency has been established as the "Redevelopment 
Agency of Salt Lake City" (See Exhibit 6). 
The Redevelopment Agency was created for the 
purposes specified in the Act. On February 4, 1971, Salt 
Lake City Corporation adopted an ordinance officially 
approving a redevelopment plan for the Project Area. 
(R. 123, see also Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8). The plan rec-
ognized that in this Project Area there were a number 
3 
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of substandard buildings and uses of land and that 
through rehabilitation in some cases or acquisition, 
clearance and rebuilding in other cases, the Project Area 
could be improved with the result, among other things, 
of the "strengthening of the tax base and economic health 
of the entire community" (See Exhibit 4, Section B, Sub-
paragraph g; see also R. 93, 94). 
Shortly after the adoption of the plan, in May of 
1971, federal monies were obtained and in June of 1971 
an executive director (M. Danny Wall) and staff were 
hired. (R. 120,122). Since May of 1971 only federal mon-
ies have been used for the operation of the Redevelop-
ment Agency and no city, county, state or other local 
funds have been used in any respect (R. 122,123, see also 
Exhibit 9). Prior to May of 1971, no city or other local 
funds were appropriated to the Redevelopment Agency 
but city officers and employees were used in the formu-
lation of the plan adopted in February of 1971 and in the 
presentation of this plan in the application of the Re-
velopment Agency for federal funds. (R. 122) 
Within the Project Area, the Redevelopment Agency 
has currently three major projects in active stages of 
planning and completion. The first is the construction 
of retail stores and an office building on the northeast 
corner of Second South and West Temple Streets. This 
project is under contract with a developer, West Temple 
Associates, and is currently in the stage of formulation 
of construction plans. (R. 134, 135) The second major 
project is on the southeast corner and is proposed to 
consist of an office building and Sheraton Hotel. The 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
developer, Hartnett and Shaw, is currently preparing a 
full scale proposal for this project which, if approved by 
the Redevelopment Agency, will result in a contract for 
the sale and development of this parcel by the developer. 
(See Exhibits 10 and 11 for a rendering of the proposal 
for this project.) * •-,
 r: . , ^, / 
The third major project and the one with which we 
are principally concerned in this action is the construc-
tion and operation of a parking facility in an area be-
tween Second and Third South Streets and extending 
to West Temple Street, excluding the corners on West 
Temple, the corner at Third South and West Temple 
occupied by Valley Bank & Trust and the corner at Second 
South and West Temple on which the proposed Sheraton 
Hotel Project would be built. (See Exhibit 12 for the 
precise location of this project.) Unlike the two other 
projects, the parking facilities would be owned by the 
Redevelopment Agency and when completed charges for 
parking would be made by the Redevelopment Agency. 
(R. 143-44, 147) The parking facilities would be oper-
ated either directly by the Redevolpment Agency or un-
der lease to a private parking operator, but in either 
event the net parking revenues, after payment of operat-
ing costs, would be used by the Redevolpment Agency. 
(R. 147) Because this is an entirely new parking facility, 
neither the City nor the Redevelopment Agency will have 
received any revenues from this facility prior to its 
completion and operation. 
To finance the proposed parking facility, the Re-
development Agency proposes to issue $15,000,000 of 
5 
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tax allocation and parking revenue bonds. (R. 92, 146, 
147). The nature of this bond issue has been approved 
by both the Redevelopment Agency (Exhibit 1) and by 
the City (Exhibit 2). The proposed bond purports to be 
an obligation of the Redevelopment Agency only and 
not of the City or of any other taxing agency and each 
bond will contain a statement on the face of the bond 
that it is not a general obligation or liability of the City 
or any other taxing agency, but only a "special" obliga-
tion of the Redevelopment Agency payable solely from 
the net parking revenues of the parking facility and 
from the "tax increment." (See Section 3 on Page 7 of 
the proposed bond resolution, a part of Exhibit 1, R. 21 
and also the form of the bond in Section 26 on pages 37-
38 of such resolution, R. 50-51. 
The nature of the tax "increment" or tax "allocation" 
requires some explanation. The formula is set forth in 
Section 6 of Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1974 (11-19-29) 
and essentially provides that if a redevelopment plan 
contains a tax allocation provision, an assessed valua-
tion base for all taxable property within the project 
area is established consisting of the assessed valuation 
of all taxable property in the project area as of the last 
equalized assessment roll prior to the adoption of a plan 
containing such a provision. Also, as explained in the 
testimony of M. Danny Wall, after the adoption of a plan 
containing such a provision and the transmission of 
such plan to the County Auditor and County Assessor and 
to each of the taxing agencies who levy taxes on prop-
erty included in the project area, the taxes thereafter 
$ 
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levied are divided between the existing taxing agencies 
and the Redevelopment Agency. (R. 156) That portion 
of the taxes produced upon the assessed value as of the 
base year is allocated to the existing taxing agencies, 
the remainder of such taxes, representing the taxes at-
tributable to the increase in assessed valuation from the 
base year, is allocated to the Redevelopment Agency. 
The taxes thus produced on this increased assessed valua-
tion is the "tax increment" referred to in the bond resolu-
tion and which is proposed to be pledged for the payment 
of the Redevelopment Agency bonds. (R. 156). 
To accomplish this, it will be necessary for the Re-
development Agency, with the approval of Salt Lake City 
and after a public hearing, to amend the existing re-
development plan to provide for the tax allocation. (See 
Utah Code Annotated, §§ 11-19-23,11-19-15 et seq.-20 and 
11-19-34.) The amendments so adopted will provide that 
the assessment base for this Project Area will be the 
assessed valuation for the year 1970, that being the last 
equalized assessment roll prior to the adoption of the 
original redevelopment plan in February of 1971. (See 
R. 96, 99) Thus, from and after the adoption of this 
amendment and its filing with the Salt Lake County Audi-
tor, Salt Lake County Assessor, Utah State Tax Commis-
sion and the various taxing agencies who tax property in 
the Project Area (Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Salt 
Lake School District and various special districts such as 
the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City, and 
the Salt Lake City Mosquito Abatement District), taxes 
levied on valuations thereafter assessed will be divided 
between the taxing agencies and the Redevelopment 
f 
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Agency in accordance with the statutory formula. Thus, 
if the redevelopment plan is so amended and this is 
accomplished in 1974, commencing in 1975, the proceeds 
of taxes collected on all property in the Project Area will 
be divided between the taxing agencies and the Rede-
velopment Agency as described above. 
Please note that there is no control attempted or 
authorized to alter the amount of the levies fixed 
by the various taxing agencies or to determine the 
assessed valuations of the Project Area from year 
to year. All that is done is to divide the proceeds of the 
taxes levied, whatever they may be, between the existing 
taxing agencies and the Redevelopment Agency in ac-
cordance with the statutory formula. 
Exhibit 13 shows in terms of known figures plus 
projections the effect of the tax allocation for the 
Project Area here involved. The 1970 assessed valuation 
for all of the taxable property in the Project Area 
was slightly in excess of $3,000,000 and this produced 
total property taxes by all taxing agencies of approxi-
mately $295,000. (See also R. 158) Taking into account 
only the estimated increase in assessed valuation as a 
result of the two projects in the Project Area, the 
building to be constructed by West Temple Associates 
and the Sheraton Hotel Office Building complex, the 
assessed valuation for the total Project Area would in-
crease to a figure between $6,400,000 and $9,800,000 and 
would result in increased taxes being collected in the 
Project Area of between $628,000 and $962,000. These 
additional taxes would be allocated to the Redevelopment 
« 
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Agency and this "tax increment" would be pledged for 
the payment of the Redevelopment Agency bonds. Ex-
hibit 14 shows that based both upon these projections of 
tax increment and similar projections of the parking 
revenues, there will be sufficient funds from these two 
sources to pay the principal and interest on the bonds 
and to build up and maintain the reserve fund required 
by the bond resolution. 
ARGUMENT 
In considering the specific issues of constitutionality 
and statutory construction raised by the following argu-
ments, it might be of assistance to consider three basic 
issues, the solution of which will assist in solving the 
specific issues and which are common to most of these 
specific issues. The first of these basic issues is the 
legal nature of the Redevelopment Agency — is it a 
separate entity public corporation or other type of poli-
tical subdivision having a legal nature separate from 
that of the City, or is it merely a department, 
agency or division of Salt Lake City? A second major 
issue is the legal nature of the proposed bonds—are they 
in fact bonds of Salt Lake City although issued in the 
name of the Redevelopment Agency? In either event, 
are they to be considered a "general obligation" bond 
within the meaning of the election requirement, debt 
limit and lending of credit provisions of the Utah Con-
stitution? The third basic issue is the legality of the 
proposed construction and operation of the parking 
facilities. Will these facilities be considered to have a 
purpose essentially private in nature or is there a public 
9 
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purpose sufficient to justify, constitutionally, the use 
of public funds for the construction and operation of 
the parking facilities? 
POINT I 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VI, SECTION 28, 
PROHIBITING DELEGATIONS TO A SPECIAL COMMIS-
SION OF THE POWER TO MAKE, SUPERVISE OR INTER-
FERE WITH A MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT OR TO PER-
FORM MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS IS VIOLATED BY THE 
UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT AND BY 
THE CREATION AND OPERATION OF THE REDEVELOP-
MENT AGENCY. 
Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 28, (formerly 
Article VI, Section 29 prior to the revision of Article VI 
which was adopted at the general election in 1971) pro-
vides as follows: ,7 
The legislature shall not delegate to any spe-
cial commission, private corporation or associa-
tion, any power to make, supervise or interfere 
with any municipal improvement, money, property 
or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to 
levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform 
any municipal functions. 
In Backmafi v. Salt Lake County, 13 UtaJh 2d 412, 375 
P.2d 756 (1962), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
three conditions are necessary to violate this provision: 
(1) delegation to a private commission of power (2) 
to interfere with municipal property or (3) to perform 
a municipal function (375 P.2d at 760). 
w 
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*"'"" A. the Redevelopment Agency is a Special Com-
mission. Although the Utah Neighborhood Development 
Act does not expressly declare redevelopment agencies 
created under it to be separate public corporations, the 
defendant Salt Lake City has treated the Redevelopment 
Agency here as such a separate entity. (R.97) The Agency 
employs its own officers and employees who are not sub-
ject to the rules applicable to city employees generally. 
(R. 173, 174) The Agency maintains separate offices, 
separate accounting records and a separate payroll. (R. 
178) The funds of the Agency are not handled by city 
officers nor commingled with city funds, but are main-
tained in a separate bank account under the sole control 
of the Agency. The Agency operates under a separate 
budget with fiscal years entirely different than those of 
the City (see Exhibit 9), and from time to time the 
Agency has borrowed funds under its own name and 
under circumstances where any obligation against the 
City is directly negated. (R. 175, 177; see also Exhibits 
15 and 16) The City has officially recognized the Agency's 
separate character and this is particularly evident in the 
resolution of October 14, 1971. (Exhibit 6) Although 
the members of the Redevelopment Agency are the same 
persons as the members of the Board of Commissioners 
bf Salt Lake City, they act in different capacities. For 
example, the mayor of the City is not automatically the 
chairman of the Redevelopment Agency, but the Rede-
velopment Agency elects its own chairman and secretary. 
The former mayor, E. J. Garn, was merely a member of 
the Agency and Commissioner Conrad Harrison is the 
chairman of the Agency. (See generally R. 91, 174). Le-
li 
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gaily, this should be held as more than a mere theoretical 
putting on of different hats, because members of the Re-
development Agency acting in that capacity have primary 
fiduciary obligations owed to the Agency to perform their 
functions in the best possible way for the benefit of the 
Agency even in dealings between the Redevelopment 
Agency and the City. See the discussion in Antieau, 3a 
Municipal Corporation Law, %30P-12. That there may be 
dealings between the City and the Redevelopment Agency 
is specifically indicated by Section 11-19-23.1 of the Act. 
..;• Finally, we point out that the Redevelopment Agency 
is, being subject to the Act, authorized to act solely for 
the limited purpose of redevelopment and only in the 
manner provided by the Act. Thus, it is not a city au-
thorized to act for a great variety of municipal purposes, 
but can only act for the limited purpose for which it was 
created. Furthermore, the Utah Neighborhood Develop-
ment Act seems to authorize the Agency to act initially on 
its own behalf without action by the City. For example, 
Section 11-10-13 of the Act permits the Agency to adopt 
a redevelopment plan but requires that after adoption 
of the plan it must be submittted to and approved by the 
legislative body of the City. Ordinarily, there would 
be no need for such approval if the Agency were consider-
ed a department or agency of the City, because in such 
case, approval by the Agency would be the equivalent of 
approval by the City. 
For the foregoing reasons, we urge that the Re-
development Agency is a special commission within.the 
constitutional prohibition. 
12 
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! B. There is a Legislative Delegation to the Rede-
velopment Agency. It was successfully argued by the 
defendants that there is no legislative delegation in vio-
lation of Article VI, Section 28 even if the Redevelop-
ment Agency is considered a special commission and 
even if it is authorized by the Utah Neighborhood De-
velopment Act to interfere with municipal improvements 
and with municipal functions. Defendants contended and 
the trial court held that any delegation involved was a 
delegation by the City itself when it created the Rede-
velopment Agency. The contention is that the City was 
authorized to make such a delegation pursuant to the Act 
if it chose to do so. (R. 94). 
The Utah cases have not specifically addressed them-
selves to this question. The Utah cases seem to fall 
under two categories—first where a state agency was 
delegated authority by the legislature which resulted in 
an interference with municipal property or municipal 
functions. Examples are cases involving the Utah Public 
Service Commission, such as City of St. George v. Public 
Utilities Commission, 62 Utah 453, 220 Pac. 720 (1923); 
Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 12 Utah 536, 
271 Pac. 961 (1928); County Water Sijstem v. Salt Lake 
City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P.2d 285 (1954); State Water 
Pollution Control Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 
247, 311 P.2d 370 (1957); and State Tax Commission v. 
City of Logan, 88 Utah 406, 54 P.2d 1197 (1936). 
A second class of cases has involved the legislative cre-
ation or authorization to create special districts or new 
types of political subdivisions operating within the geo-
15 
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graphic limit of existing cities or counties. Examples are 
Backmanv. Salt Lake County, supra; where certain large 
counties were required to hold an election which if ap-
proved would result in the establishment of a city audi-
torium board whose members would be appointed not 
exclusively by the county, but also by state officers and 
cities located within the county; Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 
Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935), approving an act author-
izing metropolitan water districts created by one or more 
municipalities after an election by the qualified municipal 
electors approving their creation and governed by a board 
of directors appointed by the municipalities comprising 
the district; Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 274, 
226 P.2d 127 (1950) approving an act authorizing the cre-
ation of water and sewer improvement districts within 
counties, such districts being initiated either by the 
county commission or by resident taxpayers of the pro-
posed district and to be governed by a board of trustees 
elected from the district; Carter v. Beaver Coumty Serv-
ice Area No. 1, 16. Utah 2d 280, 399 P.2d 440 (1965), 
invalidating an act authorizing the creation of county 
service areas in unincorporated areas of a county created 
at the instance of either resident taxpayers or the county 
commission itself and to be governed by a board of 
trustees elected from the service area so created; and 
Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2, 
23 Utah 2d 181,460 P.2d 814 (1969) holding constitutional 
on a limited basis an amended version of the county 
service area act. 
In none of these cases did the court deal expressly 
with the question of whether the legislature could author^ 
14 
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ize a city or county to delegate certain municiparfune-
tions to a special commission, although this might be 
considered implicit in the holdings of at least some of 
these cases. For example, the Carter ease, supra, involved 
a special district whose creation was initiated by the 
county whose municipal functions were found to have 
been interfered with. Thus, it would follow that the con-
sent of the county or delegation, if you will, implicit in 
the initiation of the district by the county is not sufficient 
to avoid the prohibitions of Article VI, Section 28. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court construing a con-
stitutional provision substantially identical to Article 
VI, Section 28, held that a municipality cannot, pursuant 
to enabling legislation, delegate its powers to a special 
commission or private corporation. In Lighten v. Abing-
ton Township, 336 Pa. 345, 9 A.2d 609 (1939), the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania refused to allow a town-
ship to issue non-debt revenue bonds which authorized 
a private trust company to assume control of a municipal-
ly owned sewage system in the event of default on the 
part of the city. The court reasoned: 
As the Constitution specifically deprives the state 
of power to delegate the management of the munic-
ipal property to a private corporation, certainly 
the agent, the township, will not make such a dele-
gation ; the effects of the limitation on the princi-
pal would be destroyed if the agent could do what 
was prohibited. (9A.2d at 612). 
California and Colorado have apparently reached a 
contrary result, holding that if the creation of a special 
district or special commission was approved by the local 
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municipality or even By the electors thereof, there is no 
violation of a clause similar to Article VI, Section 28. 
See, for example, City of Whittier v. Dixon, 24 Cal. 2d 
665,151 P.2d 5 (1944); Housing Authority v. Dockweiler, 
14 Cal. 2d 37, 94 P.2d 794 (1939); City of Aurora v. Au-
rora Sanitation District, 122 Colo. 407, 149 P.2d 662 
(1944). 
We suggest that the Pennsylvania rule should be 
followed here. It is consistent with the familiar princi-
ples governing the powers of municipal corporations that 
"the powers of municipal corporations are delegated 
and a municipal corporation may exercise only the powers 
granted and in the manner prescribed" (Tooele City v. 
Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 (1941)) and that 
the powers of a city are "strictly limited to those ex-
pressly granted, to those necessarily or fairly implied 
in or incident to the powers expressly granted, and to 
those essential to the declared objects and purposes of 
the corporation . . ." (American Fork City v. Robinson, 
11 Utah 168, 292 Pac. 249 (1930); Stevenson v. Salt Lake 
City Corporation, 1 U.2d 28, 317 P.2d 597 (1957)). If 
the legislature which is the source of most of the powers 
of cities and counties in this state cannot act in a par-
ticular area because of constitutional limitations, certain-
ly the legislature could not delegate to its agents, the 
cities and counties, the power to so act in the same re-
stricted areas. 
C. There is Interference with Municipal Improve-
ments and the Performance of Municipal Functions. 
There can be no question in this case but that there will 
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be a direct interference with municipal improvements. 
Recall the testimony of Mr. Wall in describing the plans 
for the parking facilities in which he indicated the neces-
sity for rerouting existing city owned water lines and 
sewer lines and described the extensive excavation of 
the streets made necessary for access to the underground 
parking facilities. (R. 181-82) Indeed, on both Second 
South and Third South Streets the entrances will be in 
the center of the street with obvious interference with 
existing traffic patterns. That these changes will be ac-
complished in cooperation with the City we have no 
doubt, but it is cooperation compelled by the activities of 
the Redevelopment Agency. 
The question of interference with a municipal func-
tion is a matter dealt with in most of the Utah cases con-
struing Article VI, Section 28. The purpose of the con-
stitutional provision has been stated to be ". . . to hold 
inviolate the right of local self-government of cities and 
towns with respect to municipal improvements, money, 
property, effects, the levying of taxes, and the perform-
ance of municipal functions . . ." (Logan City v. Public 
Utilities Commission, supra) and also "to insure, inso-
far as practicable, the powers to cities and towns to man-
age their own internal affairs . . <" (State Water Pollu-
tion Control Board v. Salt Lake City, supra). The latter 
case also contained perhaps the most succinct definition 
of the term, "municipal function," by stating the term 
"was used in its broad sense and would include any ac-
tivity properly engaged in by the city or municipality, 
whether governmental or proprietary." (311 P.2d at 374) 
The case is also instructive in prescribing a territorial 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
criterion suggesting that regulations of the State Water 
Pollution Control Board could not affect or apply to "the 
problem of sewerage disposal within Salt Lake City, and 
as affecting the inhabitants thereof . . ."• but that such 
regulations could apply if there was a menace to the 
health of other communities or inhabitants of the state 
(311 P.2d at 375). In Backman the operation of a civic 
auditorium and sports arena was declared to be a muni-
cipal function (375 P.2d at 760). In Carter v. Beaver 
County Service Area No. 1, supra, the operation of a 
hospital was held to be a municipal function and the 
court condemned the broad scope of the act there involved 
as permitting the performance of so many traditionally 
local functions as to "emasculate the performance of 
municipal functions vested by the Constitution of Utah 
in the local corporate authorities." (16 Utah 2d at 282). 
In this matter we suggest that the activities of 
the Redevelopment Agency are more local in character 
than they are state-wide in character. In the rede-
velopment process we are dealing with blighted prop-
erty. That property, of course, is located in a particular 
area and in this case wholly within the corporate limits 
of Salt Lake City. Cities have traditionally and for many 
years controlled streets and sidewalks within the cities 
(see 10-8-8 to 10-8-8.5, 10-8-11, 10-8-23, 10-8-24, 10-8-30 
and 10-8-32). Cities have long had the power to control 
buildings within the city, not only for safety purposes 
but for health and fire purposes (see 10-8-52 to 10-8-55, 
10-8-66 and 10-8-70). Regulation of buildings via zoning 
and planning has long been considered a municipal 
function (see Chapter 9 of Title 10, Utah Code Anno-
18 
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tated 1953). Through a city's power to declare and abate 
nuisances, blighted conditions in an area can be cured 
(10-8-60; see also Salt Lake City Ordinances, Chapter 
26 of Title 18). The power of a city to acquire and 
dispose of property is established by Section 10-8-2, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. 
Thus, in virtually every aspect of the redevelop-
ment process existing municipal authority can be found. 
It is simply a question of whether or not the City chooses 
to exercise this authority. Furthermore, the construction 
and operation of parking facilities are expressly made a 
proper function of cities in this state by Section 10-8-8, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. Parking itself is essentially a 
local matter affecting primarily the immediately sur-
rounding area contiguous or at small distances from the 
location of the parking facility. While undoubtedly visi-
tors to Salt Lake City from other parts of the state and 
nation will be benefitted by improvements to the Project 
Area, this is a generalized benefit and the primary bene-
fit remains with the inhabitants of the City. Thus, we do 
not contest the trial court's finding of state-wide impact 
(R. 94). We merely point out that these are problems 
which are characteristically solved on a city-wide basis 
with the primary benefits thereof going to the residents 
of Salt Lake City. 
We are aware of the California cases holding that 
redevelopment is a state function (see Fellow v. Re-
development Agency, 157 Cal. App. 2d 243, 320 P.2d 884 
(1958); In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project IB, 
37 Cal, Rep. 74, 389 P.2d 538 (1964), but these California 
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cases are readily distinguishable because in California 
the authority for redevelopment agencies to act is es-
tablished by a state constitutional provision (Cal. Con-
stitution, Article XIII, Section 19) which, as the Bunker 
Hill case pointed out, modified the prior constitutional 
provisions granting charter cities control over "municipal 
affairs" (389 P.2d at 572). The Colorado cases of Rabi-
noff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114 (Colo. 1961); and 
People v. Newton, 101 P.2d 21 (Colo. 1940), although 
stating generally that urban renewal and public housing 
were state functions, are not helpful because both cases 
fail to discuss Article V, Section 35 of the Colorado Con-
stitution which is virtually identical to the Utah pro-
visions of Article VI, Section 28. 
In conclusion on this point, we commend to the court 
the extensive discussion of the history and varying in-
terpretations of constitutiotniai provisions similar to Arti-
cle VI, Section 28 in the two-part article by David 0. 
Porter, "The Ripper Clause in State Constitutional Law: 
An Early Urban Experiment," found in Volume 1969 
Nos. 2 and 3 for April and June of 1969 of the Utah Law 
Review. 
POINT II 
THE PROPOSED REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY BONDS 
CONSTITUTE A DEBT OF THE CITY WITHIN THE MEAN-
ING OF UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE XIV, SECTIONS 
3 AND 4. 
If, in fact, the proposed Kedevelopment Agency 
bonds are to be considered in legal effect obligations of 
Salt Lake City and if the bonds by their terms are such 
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obligations as to constitute debt within the meaning of 
the constitutional provisions, Article XIV, Section 3 
would require the bonds to be authorized by vote of a 
majority of the city electors voting at an election where 
such a proposition is submitted, and Article XIV, Section 
4 would require such bonds to be included in the compu-
tation of indebtedness for purposes of the debt limit pre-
scribed in such section. Reference is made to Exhibit 17 
for an analysis of the outstanding debt of Salt Lake 
City. From this it will be observed that the $15,000,000 
of Redevelopment Agency bonds will not in amount 
exceed the taxes and other revenues of the City for the 
current fiscal year, but because the Redevelopment 
Agency bonds are payable and intended to be payable 
over a period of years rather than during the current 
year, an election would be required if the constitutional 
provisions apply (See State v. Spring City, 123 Utah 471, 
260'P.2d 527 (1953)). Furthermore, Exhibit 17 indicates 
that if the Redevelopment Agency bonds are issued 
against the present city general obligation bonded indebt-
edness and applying the debt limit computed from the 
1973 assessed valuation, the debt limit of the City would 
not, in fact, be exceeded, but, of course, the availability 
of the unused debt limit for other purposes would be di-
minished to the extent of the $15,000,000 of bonds pro-
posed to be issued. 
The real questions then become whether the Rede-
velopment Agency bonds are to be considered an obliga-
tion of Salt Lake City and, if so, whether the bonds are of 
the type which would constitute "debt" within the mean-
ing of the constitutional provisions. 
21 
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A. The Redevelopment Agency Bonds are to be 
Considered Obligations of Salt Lake City. In our amend-
ed complaint we have pleaded inconsistently and in the 
alternative (See paragraph 9, Amended Complaint) and 
our'argument is inconsistent and in the alternative to 
the argument posed in Part A of Point I. We here con-
tend that the'Redevelopment Agency is in legal effect 
simply an agency, department or subdivision of Salt Lake 
City and thus obligations of the Agency are, in fact, 
obligations of the City. We contest the trial court's Find-
ings of Fact 8, 13 and 14 (E. 93, 95) and Conclusions of 
Law 3 and 4 (R. 98-99). 
The Utah Neighborhood Development Act in author-
izing the creation of redevelopment agencies does not in 
terms establish the agency as a separate body politic 
and corporate, or as a separate political subdivision of the 
state. There is simply no such statement in the law. 
Contrast the express statement in Section 11-15-4 relating 
to redevelopment agencies created under the provisions 
of the Utah Community Development Law, a statute 
not here involved. This has great significance for the 
application of the constitutional debt limit and election 
requirement because the Utah Courts have construed 
the constitutional provisions strictly and applied them 
only to counties, cities, towns and school districts. Special 
districts created by or under the authority of statutes, 
which districts are legal entities, separate and apart 
from the designated political subdivisions, have been 
held not to be subject to the constitutional debt limit (See 
Note, "Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal In-
debtedness/' 1966 Utah Law Review 462 at 478). Thus, in 
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Lehi City v. Meiling, supra, the court held the debt limita-
tion and election requirements did not apply because 
the metropolitan water district was a "quasi-municipal" 
corporation rather than a true municipal corporation such 
as a county, city, town or school district. Similar hold-
ings were reached in Patterich v. Carbon Cownty Water 
Conservancy District, 106 Utah 55,145 P. 2d 503 (1944) 
involving the water conservancy districts and Freeman 
v. Stewart, 2 Utah 2d 319, 273 P. 2d 174 (1954) involving 
improvement districts for water, sewer or sewage sys-
tems. See also Tygesen v. Magna Water Company, supra, 
and Provo City v. Evans, 87 Utah 292, 48 P. 2d 555 
(1935). The distinction has been questioned in the more 
recent cases, however. For example, in Backman v. Salt 
Lake County, supra, although the case was decided on 
other grounds, the court referred to the fact that the 
special district there involved may have been established 
in order to avoid the constitutional debt limit (375 P. 2d 
at 761) and this; could be considered the holding or at 
least an alternative holding in Carter v. Beaver County 
Service Area No. 1, supra. The decision of Justice Ellett 
in Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2, supra, 
seems to revive the distinction somewhat, but the breadth 
of this holding was considerably qualified by the cautions 
expressed in Justice Crockett's concurring opinion in that 
case (23 Utah 2d at 187-88). Where there is a separate 
body politic and corporate established by thei enabling 
act, the distinction is perhaps easier to make, but where, 
as here, such a separation is not clearly provided for 
in the law, proper construction would seem to indicate 
that a separate entity was not intended and that the re^ 
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development agency is in fact a department or agency of 
the city which creates it. r : / t 
A further indication of legislative intent in this re-
gard is the fact that if a city elects to create a redevelop-
ment agency, the legislative body of that city is to be 
designated as the agency (See 11-19-3). In other words, 
the enabling statute does not authorize anyone but the 
legislative body of the community creating the agency to 
be the redevelopment agency. Accordingly, it would ap-
pear that for redevelopment agencies generally and, of 
course, for the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City 
here involved, there is an identity between the governing 
body of the city or county creating it and the agency it-
self. (E. 91,94-95) 
Note that it is not important at least for purposes 
of the election requirement that the redevelopment agency 
be defined as a "department" of the city similar to, for 
example, its water department. It is enough that it be 
considered a "subdivision" of the city ("No debt . . . shall 
be created . . . by any city . . . or any subdivision thereof 
in this state [without an election]"). 
B. The Redevelopment Bonds Constitute a "Debt" 
We recognize that our burden is not met by simply estab-
lising the redevelopment agency bonds as some type of 
obligation of Salt Lake City. In addition, we must es-
tablish, contrary to the findings of the trial court, (R. 95, 
98) that these bonds constitute a "debt" within the mean-
ing of the constitutional limitations, for it is clear that 
if the obligation were a limited type obligation payable 
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only from a special fund, there is no debt, and neither 
the election requirements of Article XIV, § 3 of the Utah 
Constitution, nor the debt limitations of Article XIV, § 
4 would be applicable to the particular obligations. 
The special fund doctrine was first enunciated by 
our Supreme Court in Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 
279 Pac. 878 (1929). In Barnes, Lehi City's mayor and 
councilmen sought to purchase generating equipment 
for the city's electric power plant with payments financed 
through the issuance of bonds to be retired solely from 
revenues received from the operation of the electric plant. 
Because the only source of payment of the obligation was 
to be the revenues produced from the electric system, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the issuance of the bonds 
created no debt in the constitutional sense and thus there 
was no requirement that the taxpayers approve the is-
suance* of the bonds. This result obtained because the 
bondholders could not look to any tax money as a source 
of payment of the bonds. The principles of this case 
have been followed in a number of other cases including: 
Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P. 2d 144 
(1933); Wadsworth v. Samtaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 
P.2d 161 (1933), Utah Power and Light Company v. 
Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 74 P. 2d 1191 (1937); Utah 
Power & Light Company v. Ogden City, 95 Utah 161, 79 
P.2d 61 (1938); and Barlow v. Clearfield City, 1 Utah 
2d 419, 268 P.2d 682 (1954). 
We concede that the Redevelopment Agency bonds 
here involved would fit within this special fund exception 
if the pledge were limited only to the parking revenues 
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because in such case the obligation to the bondholders 
would be limited to new revenues derived solely from the 
parking facility. The proceeds of the bonds would have 
been used solely for the construction of a revenue pro-
ducing facility, the revenues would not theretofore have 
gone into the general fund of the City to help reduce 
the property tax burden on the taxpayers of the City, 
and the sole source of payment of the bond would be the 
new revenues from the parking facility. 
However with the addition of the pledge of the tax 
increment to the Redevelopment Agency bonds, we con-
tend a debt is created—the pledge of the tax increment 
constituting a diversion from the general fund. The 
special fund doctrine is limited by the principles of the 
Fjeldsted case, supra. There, this court determined that 
despite the creation of a special fund which is declared 
to be the sole source of payment of the bonds, if some 
of the funds going into the special fund had theretofore 
gone into the general funds of the municipality, a debt 
would be created in the constitutional sense. The Fjeld-
sted court held that this diversion from the general fund 
would indirectly increase the burden on property tax-
payers which would impair the protection to taxpayers 
intended by the constitution's debt limit and election 
requirements. 
Note that in Fjeldsted the court did not rely on 
proof of any actual diversion of a particular amount of 
money from the general fund. A close reading of that 
case indicates no evidence being considered by that court 
of any diversion in fact. The theory of the court seemed 
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to be that because the water works system there involved 
had, prior to the issuance of the bonds, produced revenues 
which, after payment of operation and maintenance ex-
penses of the system, were deposited in the general fund, 
the taxpayers had the right to assume that such revenues 
would continue to be deposited in the general fund 
thus making unnecessary an increase in mill levy or im-
position of additional other taxes to cover the general 
operating expenses of the city. There was no evidence 
that the "diversion" to the special fund in fact caused 
an increase in mill levy or other burden on the property 
taxpayer. Furthermore, the court did not consider the 
other side of the balance sheet—the possible benefits to 
the general fund arising from the improvements to the 
system financed by the diverted revenues. Without the 
financed improvements the general fund might well have 
been in worse condition because of the payment of addi-
tional expenses of operation and maintenance and the 
"burden".on the property taxpayers thus increased. 
Thus, on analysis we conclude that the Fjeldsted court 
was dealing merely with the possibility of diversion from 
the general fund and the possibility of indirect "feeding'' 
of the special fund from general revenues. See Note, 
"Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal Indebted-
ness, ' ' 1966 Utah ham Review, 462 at 471-78. 
In this case we contend the tax increment which is 
pledged to the payment of the proposed Redevelopment 
Agency bonds constitutes a similar possibility of diver-
sion from the general fund of the City. Indeed, in this 
case it seems there is a direct diversion because we are 
here dealing with an allocation of the property taxes 
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themselves, not revenues of the City other than property 
taxes. By the tax allocation provided for in the statute 
and authorized in the bond resolution (Exhibit 1) a por-
tion of the property taxes collected will be actually di-
verted from the City general fund where it would other-
wise go and instead pledged to the Eedevelopment Agency 
bonds. 
The argument that the tax increment is created by 
the activities of the agency and thus is not something 
on which the property taxpayers of the City could rely, 
misses the point. First, the restricted special fund doc-
trine requires pledge of and payment from only those 
funds generated solely from the operation of the facility 
financed with the bonds. The doctrine has never been 
applied to funds generated from increases in assessed 
valuation attributable to construction of the facility or to 
redevelopment in the vicinity of the facility. All of the 
Utah cases involving cities and towns from Barnes v. Lehi 
City, supra, to the present have involved a self-liquidat-
ing operation where the pledged special fund was cre-
ated from the operation of the financed facility. A possi-
ble exception to this limitation in Utah jurisprudence 
is Conder v. University of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 P.2d 
367 (1953) where approval was given to bonds used to 
finance a dormitory even though land grant revenues in 
addition to dormitory revenues were pledged for the 
payment of the bonds. This is not a real departure, how-
ever, because the court was there construing the state 
constitutional debt limit contained in Article XIV, Sec-
tion 1 and not the city and county debt limits and elec-
tion requirements of Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4. 
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In the second place the premise of defendant that 
the tax increment is created by the activities of the Re-
development Agency is inaccurate. The assessed values 
in the area are influenced by more than the mere con-
struction of the parking facility and redevelopment oc-
curring in the area. Land values are characteristically 
affected by a great number of factors. There is no evi-
dence indicating some or all of these factors do not 
equally apply to land within the Project Area here in-
volved. For example, values are continuously affected 
by economic trends, and, more practically, who would 
contest that property values can also be affected by what 
occurs on adjacent property or by property in the imme-
diate neighborhood. Thus, if substantial additions were 
made to the Salt Palace complex, which is outside the 
Project Area, there could well be an increase in value 
of all properties in the Project Area. Furthermore, the 
court, we believe, can take judicial notice of the general 
inflationary trend which has increased at least the nomi-
nal value of a great many items with real estate perhaps 
leading the way. Through tax allocation, the existing 
Jtaxing agencies, including the City, are deprived of the 
benefit, via greater tax collections, of such increases in 
value. While it may be said that these potential benefits 
are theoretical, they are no less theoretical than the diver-
sion of revenues discussed in the Fjeldsted case. , -
We recognize that the Fjeldsted rule sometimes des-
ignated the "Restricted Special Fund Doctrine," has 
been criticized by text writers (See Williams and Nehem-
kis, "Municipal Improvements As Affected by Constitu-
tional Debt Limitations," 37 Columbia Law Review 177) 
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and undoubtedly represents a minority viewpoint (72 
A.L.R. 687; 96 A.L.R. 1385; 146 A.L.R. 333). Nonethe-
less, Fjeldsted has not been overruled and, in fact, has 
been cited with approval in the recent case of Allen v. 
Tooele County, 21 Utah 2d 383, 445 P. 2d 995 (1968). 
Thus, we believe that the pledge of the tax increment 
does involve a violation of the restrictions established 
by the Fjeldsted case. The consequence is that the bonds 
would not be considered payable solely from a special 
fund but would be considered "debt" and subject to the 
constitutional election requirement and debt limitations of 
Article XIV of the Utah Constitution. 
POINT III 
THE LENDING OF CREDIT PROVISIONS OF OUR CON-
STITUTION WILL BE VIOLATED BY THE ISSUANCE 
OF THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY BONDS AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF THE PARKING 
FACILITIES. 
A. There is a Lending of Credit. Allen v. Tooele 
County, supra, construed Article VI, Section 29 of the 
Utah Constitution and held that credit was not lent in 
violation of this provision if the bonds to be issued quali-
fied under the Restricted Special Fund Doctrine of Fjeld-
sted. However, if the obligations do or might involve a 
burden on taxpayers, credit would be lent. Accordingly, 
for the same reasons outlined in Point I I contending that 
the obligations are city obligations and that the Fjeld-
sted restrictions are violated, there is a debt involved 
here and thus a lending of credit in violation of Article 
VI, Section 29. (cf. R. 95, 99) 
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B. The Credit Lent is in Aid of a Private Enter-
prise or Undertaking. The question here involves inquiry 
into the public purpose of, first, redevelopment plans 
generally, and second, the proposals of the Kedevelop-
ment Agency for the parking facilities to be constructed 
in the Project Area. 
Many state courts have approved the constitution-
ality of redevelopment agency legislation usually follow-
ing the rationale of the United States Supreme Court 
case of Berrmm v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), where the 
constitutionality of a congressional act authorizing re-
development for the District of Columbia was upheld. 
The Court in that case gave great weight to the legisla-
tive declarations of purpose and findings of need for 
public participation contained in the enabling statute. 
These declarations and findings were said to be "well-
nigh conclusive" (348 U.S. at 32). Significantly, the 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act contains no such 
statements of purpose and no findings that public parti-
cipation in the redevelopment process is required or 
necessary. 
Even in cases upholding state redevelopment stat-
utes, limitations have been imposed. For example, in 
Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 
266 P.2d 105 (1954), the court stated:
 v 
It must be pointed out that neither aesthetic 
views nor considerations of economic advantage 
to the community or a combination of both are 
sufficient to justify the use of eminent domain 
for redevelopment purposes. The redevelopment 
program must be necessary to protect the public 
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health, morals, safety or general welfare through 
the elimination of blighted areas. 
# # # 
Public agencies and courts both should be 
chary of the use of the act unless, as here, there 
is a situation where the blight is such that it con-
stitutes a real hindrance to the development of 
the city and cannot be eliminated or improved 
without public assistance. It never can be used 
because the public agency considers that it can 
make a better use or planning of an area than 
its present use or plan. 266 P. 2d 121, 127 (cita-
tions omitted). 
Other courts have directly invalidated the legislation. 
See, for example, Housing Authority v. Johnson, 74 S.E. 
2d 891 (Ga. 1953) and Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 
S.E. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952). In the latter case the Florida 
Court stated that the incidental benefits accruing to 
the public from the establishment of some private enter-
prise were not sufficient to make the functioning of the 
enterprise a public purpose. The thrust of the opinion 
suggests that increased employment, revenues and other 
varying public benefits were too tangential to give the 
entire plan a public purpose. 
An extensive discussion of the scope of the public pur-
pose doctrine is contained in the case of Hogue v. Port 
of Seattle, 341 P. 2d 171 (Washington 1959). In Hogue, 
the act authorized the creation of industrial develop-
ment districts from land having specified characteristics 
and classified as "marginal lands." The opinion of the 
court discussed the extensive legislative history which 
involved among other things the findings of the legisla-
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ture and citizens' groups that the Seattle area was too 
dependent on the single industry of Boeing and that it 
was important to develop additional industry for the 
area. The act involved contained extensive findings and 
declarations of public purpose and of need for the 
authority granted to acquire the land and dispose of it 
to private enterprise. Despite these findings and dec-
larations, the court concluded that the real purpose of 
the proposed acquisitions was merely to provide poten-
tial industrial sites for future use by business for factor-
ies, warehouses, machine shops or other industrial en-
terprises. The court further reasoned that each step in 
a redevelopment plan becomes incidental to a public 
purpose only if the primary purpose of the overall plan 
is a public purpose. And, regardless of the honest legis-
lative belief that the acquisition and development of 
land for these uses were essentially for the public good, 
the Hogue court properly maintained that it was its 
duty to uphold the rights of property owners against 
the inroads of public bodies seeking to acquire their land 
for essentially private purposes. (See 341 P.2d at 193) 
Testimony in the instant case was to the effect that 
many undesirable conditions existed in the buildings and 
structures in the Project Area prior to acquisition and 
redevelopment by the Redevelopment Agency (R. 125-27, 
Exhibit 7; R. 172-73; see also R. 93-94) We do not dispute 
this testimony, but suggest to the court that despite the 
trial court's findings, the stubborn fact remains that a 
large part of this property will be merely returned to 
private enterprise and thus the Redevelopment Agency 
is a mere conduit for changing the ownership of a specific 
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piece of property from one private owner to another 
private owner. Also, we commend to the court the cau-
tions expressed in the Hayes case quoted above. Is the 
redevelopment plan necessary to protect the public 
health, morals, safety or general welfare through the 
elimination of blighted areas in the two blocks contained 
in the project, or is it merely a situation where the Ee-
development Agency here believes that it can make a 
better use or planning of an area than its present use or 
plan? 
A further question arises in considering the parking 
facilities portion of the redevelopment plan. Are these 
parking facilities, title to which will apparently remain 
in the Eevelopment Agency, facilities that will be for 
public benefit or will they primarily aid the private 
property owners in the immediate area? Consider the 
fact that the Sheraton Hotel project will in its lower 
stories open out into the parking facility. Consider fur-
ther the commitments made by the Eedevelopment Agency 
to various property owners within the Project Area 
that certain parking spaces would be committed for their 
use. We recognize this commitment was not in the form 
of reserving a designated number of spaces in the park-
ing facility nor was there a commitment not to charge 
these property owners for the use of the parking spaces. 
Nevertheless, there is a direct involvement with these 
adjacent property owners that calls into question the 
purely public nature of the facility. Furthermore, park-
ing, particularly in a downtown area as here, will be 
used primarily, if not exclusively, by customers, invitees, 
and employees of businesses in the immediate area. We 
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suggest that the court must balance these private benefits 
against the public benefits and if the former predominate, 
the Utah Neighborhood Development Act, or at least the 
plan for the parking facilities in this case, must fail. 
POINT IV 
THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF 
THE PARKING FACILITIES WILL RESULT IN THE 
GRANTING OF PRIVATE BENEFITS CONTRARY TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
In 10b of the Amended Complaint, we have alleged 
violation of Article I, Sections 7, 22, 23 and 24 of 
the Utah Constitution and the 14th amendment to the 
United States Constitution. All of these provisions in 
one way or another prohibit public activities in the pri-
vate sphere and prohibit the use of public funds for private 
purposes. For the reasons set forth in Part B of our 
Argument under Point III where we discussed public 
purpose, we urge that these violations are established, 
despite the trial court's contrary findings. (R. 95-96) 
POINT V 
THE ALLOCATION OF TAXES TO THE REDE-
VELOPMENT AGENCY AND THE USE OF THESE 
AND OTHER FUNDS BY THE REDEVELOPMENT 
AGENCY VIOLATES UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTI-
CLE XIII, SECTION 5. 
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 5, pro-
vides as follows: 
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for 
the purpose of any county, city, town or other 
municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in 
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the corporate authorities thereof, respectively, 
the power to assess and collect taxes for all pur-
poses of such corporation. 
In State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 Pac. 1061 (1901), 
the Utah Supreme Court first considered this constitu-
tional provision in invalidating a state statute requiring 
counties to impose taxes for fruit tree inspectors for the 
county where the inspectors were employed and their 
duties and functions controlled by a state official. The 
court stated that the constitutional provision was "a limi-
tation upon the power of the legislature to grant the right 
or impose the duty of creating a debt or levying a tax 
to any person or body other than the corporate authori-
ties of the county." (66 Pac. at 1063). The court further 
construed this constitutional provision as preserving local 
self government for the people of each city and county. 
"The right of the legislature was to provide for and put 
in action, not to run and operate, the machinery of the 
local government to the disfranchisement of the people." 
(66 Pac. at 1062). 
Subsequent cases have upheld statutes under this 
provision if the statute involved a state purpose as 
opposed to a city or county purpose (See for example, 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 548, 134 
Pac. 560 (1913); Bailey v. Yam Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 240 
Pac. 454 (1925); Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Grand County, 
51 Utah 294, 170 Pac. 74, 3 A.L.R. 1224 (1917); Smith v. 
Carbon County, 90 Utah 560, 63 P. 2d 259, 108 A.L.R. 
513 (1936). We have discussed in Part C of Point I of 
this brief the question of municipal function as opposed 
to state function, and we suggest that the question of 
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municipal purpose under Article XIII, Section 5 involves 
the same criteria. We conclude here as we did in our 
earlier discussion that the operation of the Redevelop-
ment Agency and the carrying out of the redevelopment 
plan in this case is a municipal purpose and not a state 
purpose. 
If there is no state purpose, there is a violation of 
Article XIII, Section 5 in the context at least of the tax 
allocation provisions of the Act. By the statute, the 
legislature requires existing taxing agencies to share a 
portion of the taxes they levy with the Redevelopment 
Agency. This is a clear interference with the power of 
the city and of the county to "collect taxes for all pur-
poses of such corporation." Taxes lawfully collected 
must be turned over to the Redevelopment Agency. And 
the trial court specifically held that the Agency is neither 
a municipal nor a county body. (R. 97) The Agency's 
undertakings, the court also held, are not of a municipal 
or county-wide nature. (R. 94, 97). 
While it might be contended that the City has con-
sented to this by creating the Redevelopment Agency and 
approving the proposal to issue bonds secured in part 
by the tax increment, this is no answer as regards to 
Salt Lake County and the other taxing agencies who levy 
taxes in the Project Area. These entities were not in-
volved in the creation of the Redevelopment Agency and 
will not be involved in the establishment of the tax incre-
ment except as they have the right to object thereto at a 
public hearing when the plan is amended to* provide for 
the tax allocation (See 11-19-34 and 11-19-16). Taxes 
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levied in accordance with law for county and school dis-
trict purposes and the purposes of the other taxing 
agencies will, after collection, be transferred to the Re-
development Agency and thus it appears there is a clear 
violation of the constitutional prohibitions. 
POINT VI 
THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY IS SUBJECT 
TO THE BUDGETARY LAWS APPLICABLE TO 
CITIES. 
With regard to the violations of the budget laws, the 
record is plain that the Redevelopment Agency here does 
not comply with the budget laws applicable to Salt Lake 
City. Its budget is entirely independent from the city 
budget and receipts and expenditures are handled en-
tirely separate from city funds. (Exhibit 9; E. 130-31, 
175-76) If, as we have contended in Point I I of this 
brief, the Redevelopment Agency is simply a department, 
agency or subdivision of the City, then the normal budget 
laws found in Sections 10-10-23 to 10-10-75, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, must be complied with, and fund hand-
ling procedures, including the funds pledged to the pay-
ment of the proposed Redevelopment Agency bonds 
would have to be handled and administered in accordance 
with these laws. 
POINT VII 
THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION OP TAXES US-
ING AN ASSESSED VALUATION BASE OF 1970 CON-
STITUTES A RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE 
ENABLING LAW IN VIOLATION OF PROPER PRIN-
CIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
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In Paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint we have 
alleged that the amended redevelopment plan for the 
Project Area proposed by the Redevelopment Agency 
will provide for a valuation base as of February 11,1971, 
the date of the adoption of the original redevelopment 
plan. (This translates to an assessed valuation base for 
the year 1970, as that was the last equalized assessment 
roll prior to February 11, 1971). Use of the tax incre-
ment as a method of financing redevelopment agencies 
was first authorized by Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1974 
which became effective April 4,1974. Thus, in 1971 when 
the original redevelopment plan was adopted there was 
no possibility of including in the plan at that time pro-
vision for allocation of the tax increment to the Eede-
velopment Agency. We question the right of the Re-
development Agency to use this retroactive date and 
suggest that the amendment must use a base measured 
by the last equalized assessment roll at the time of the 
amendment to the plan, presumably the assessment roll 
for 1973 or for 1974, if it is then final. 
There is a general and well established principle 
of statutory construction that statutes should be given a 
prospective operation only. See 73 Am. Jur.2d, u Stat-
utes" §§ 347-55. In addition to this principle, if the 
retrospective operation of a law impairs property rights 
or vested rights, the due process clauses of the Utah and 
United States Constitutions would be violated (73 Am. 
Jur.U "%riistics J i at 485-86). 
Exhibit 18 (Total Tax Assessment and Property 
Taxes, Blocks 58 and 69, Plat "A" for the years 1966 
through 1973, R. 87) indicates that the assessed valua-
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tibn of the Project Area declined from 1970 when it 
was $3,289,250 to 1973 when it was $3,048,310, a decline 
in these four years of $240,940. Thus, if the 1970 valua-
tion is used when the plan is amended, as is intended by 
the Redevelopment Agency, the base for determining 
the tax increment will be higher and the amount of the 
tax increment less. If this plan is followed, the existing 
taxing agencies will suffer less diversion of their tax 
resources and the Redevelopment Agency will gain less 
tax increment funds. It would thus appear that any 
property rights or vested rights of the existing taxing 
agencies and the taxpayers thereof would not be im-
paired by the retrospective application of the statute 
and thus our claim of violation of due process is not 
factually supportable in the instant case. 
However, there still remains the troubling question 
of the principle of statutory construction against retro-
active applications. The existence of this doctrine cre-
ates uncertainty which should be resolved by a declara-
tory judgment of this court. The only similar case we 
have found on this subject is Redevelopment Agency v. 
Cooper, 72 Cal. Rptr. 557, (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). That 
case held that a 1963 enactment of the California legis-
lature authorizing tax increment financing could be used 
by a redevelopment agency established in April of 1959. 
The case further held that an amendment to the orig-
inal redevelopment plan approved in 1968 authorizing 
the tax allocation must use the valuation base of 1959 
when the plan was originally adopted. There was no 
discussion of the rationale for this, the court simply 
applying the 1963 statute literally with no real consid-
er 
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eration of the question of retroactivity. Furthermore, 
unlike the facts in this case, the assessed valuation had 
increased from the date of the original plan to the date 
of the amendment by some $5,000,000 and by using the 
older assessed valuation as the base for the tax alloca-
tion, the Redevelopment Agency obtained a greater allo-
cation than otherwise. Here the converse is true with 
the older assessed valuation being higher than the current 
assessed valuation. 
In view of these uncertainties, we ask that the Court 
determine and declare whether or not the statute should 
be applied to the 1970 valuation base as opposed 
to a current valuation base. We suggest that the current 
valuation base is more appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully suggest 
to the Court that the Redevelopment Agency is either a 
special commission interfering with activities essentially 
municipal in character in violation of Article VI, Section 
28 of the Utah Constitution, or a subdivision of the 
City, to which constitutional bonding restrictions and 
budgeting laws should be applicable. 
If the Agency is to be classified as merely a depart-
ment or subdivision of the City and not as a separate 
body politic, the issuance of bonds to finance the parking 
facilities must be with the approval of the Salt Lake 
City electorate, as the bonds essentially become obliga-
tions of the City. It also follows that the bonds are a 
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debt in the constitutional sense and the credit of the City 
is lent contrary to Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah 
Constitution. The Kestricted Special Fund Doctrine does 
not provide an exception to these conclusions because 
there is a diversion of tax moneys — a pledge of a source 
of payment, the tax increment, which indirectly burdens 
the taxpayers contrary to the limitations of such Doc-
trine. 
Furthermore, the legislative directive to transfer the 
tax increment to a redevelopment agency when a redevel-
opment plan so provides is an unconstitutional imposition 
of taxes for county or city purposes contrary to Article 
XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. The tax incre-
ment is not saved from such a constitutional violation nor 
is the status of a redevelopment agency as a constitution-
ally prohibited "special commission" altered by conten-
tions that the Utah Neighborhood Development Act in-
volves a state rather than a municipal or local purpose. 
Also, redevelopment plans authorized by the Utah 
Neighborhood Development Act are essentially for a 
private rather than a public purpose. All these plans can 
involve the taking of property from one owner at the 
behest of the government in order to transfer the prop-
erty to another owner, albeit in altered form. This 
private purpose is particularly evident in the plan in-
volved in this case where parking facilities will be con-
structed at public expense whose use involves substantial 
private benefits to adjoining property owners. This pre-
dominately private purpose confirms the unconstitutional 
lending of the public credit for private benefit and also 
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gives rise to due process and equal protection violations 
of state and federal constitutional provisions. 
Finally, and even if no constitutional violations are 
found, we ask for an interpretation of the Utah Neigh-
borhood Development Act to require the use of a current 
valuation base rather than a retroactive valuation base 
where tax increment allocation is adopted as a part of a 
redevelopment plan. 
For the foregoing reasons, we urge a reversal of 
the decision of the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 
& MCDONOUGH 
H. R. Waldo, Jr. 
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